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ABSTRACT
How do ﬁnancial remittances inﬂuence electoral participation in
violent democracies? Previous work has focused on the
‘substitution eﬀect’; if recipients depend on remittances for
welfare rather than the state, they become disengaged from
formal political processes and less likely to vote in elections.
However, while remittances can be used to substitute for state
provision of welfare goods, they cannot fully substitute for public
security. In this paper, we posit that the ability of governments to
contain crime and violence conditions the eﬀect of remittances on
electoral participation. Speciﬁcally, we argue that high levels of
crime can negate the substitution eﬀect and make remittance
recipients more likely to vote. Using municipality-level data from
Mexico and individual-level data from Latin America and sub-
Saharan Africa, we ﬁnd that both the receipt of remittances and
crime exposure signiﬁcantly reduce individuals’ propensity to vote
and that aggregate remittances and crime rates are correlated
with lower turnout. Remittances can, however, negate the
turnout-suppressing eﬀects of crime, and crime can negate the
turnout-suppressing eﬀects of remittances. Our results suggest a
need to account for government provision of both substitutable
and non-substitutable goods when investigating the eﬀects of
remittances on political participation.
KEYWORDS
Political participation;
turnout; remittances; crime;
violence
1. Introduction
How do international remittances complement (or challenge) the capacity of the state to
provide security to the citizenry? Recent research has provided signiﬁcant insights into the
relationship between remittance inﬂows, electoral participation and welfare goods pro-
vision (Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Germano 2013, 2018), but the relationship between
remittances and security remains understudied. This is an important topic when we con-
sider that many remittance-receiving countries in the developing world are electoral
democracies with weak state institutions that are troubled by criminal violence (LaFree
and Tseloni 2006). While experiences of crime can act as an impetus for non-electoral
forms of political participation (Bateson 2012), most studies ﬁnd that crime and violence
decrease electoral turnout by encouraging citizens to abandon formal channels of
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participation and take refuge in their private spheres (Trelles and Carreras 2012; Vivanco
et al. 2014; Ley 2018).
Some scholars have posited a connection between crime and international migration.
Hiskey, Montalvo, and Orcés (2014) have shown that weak state institutions and insecur-
ity in Latin America help to drive emigration and thus remittances, and several studies
have presented evidence that crime tends to reduce the amount of remittances sent
(Vargas-Silva 2009; Meseguer, Ley, and Ibarra-Olivo 2017). Little is known, however,
about the joint eﬀects of remittances and crime on political participation. Analysing
how remittances and crime jointly inﬂuence political behaviour in migrant-sending
countries can help to shed light on the mechanisms underlying decisions to vote in democ-
racies, where ‘violent pluralism’ is pervasive (Pérez-Arméndariz 2019).
In this paper, we investigate how crime and violence interact with remittances to
inﬂuence individuals’ decisions about whether to turn out to vote. We employ two
approaches. The ﬁrst uses municipal-level data from Mexico to investigate how the
impact of remittance inﬂows on electoral turnout varies with diﬀerent levels of violence
at the subnational level. The second uses survey data from Latin America and Africa
and explores whether individual perceptions of insecurity and crime victimisation
inﬂuence the incentives of remittance-recipients to participate in elections. At both
levels of analysis, we ﬁnd that remittances negate the turnout-suppressing eﬀects of
crime and that crime negates the turnout-suppressing eﬀects of remittances.
The paper is organised as follows. First, we discuss how remittances and crime can
aﬀect electoral turnout and advance a series of hypotheses about the interactive eﬀect of
remittance receipt and experiences and fears of crime on voting. Second, we use munici-
pal-level data from Mexico to analyse the relationship between aggregate remittances,
crime levels and turnout rates. Third, we turn to survey data from Latin America and
Africa to explore the individual-level relationship between receipt of remittances, experi-
ences and fears of crime and the propensity to vote. We conclude by discussing the impli-
cations of our ﬁndings and suggesting potential avenues for further research.
2. How can remittances and crime aﬀect electoral turnout?
Many existing studies of the electoral consequences of crime and remittances focus on the
case of Mexico. Previous research on this country shows that remittance-receiving individ-
uals (or households) are less likely to go to the polls. Goodman and Hiskey (2008) found
that voter turnout rates for the 2000 presidential election in Mexico were negatively associ-
ated with the percentage of households receiving remittances at the municipal level. They
corroborated this ﬁnding with survey data, showing that those living in Mexican towns
with high levels of emigration were less likely to participate in elections regardless of
their involvement in non-political community organisations. Using survey data collected
in ten rural communities in Michoacán, Mexico, Germano (2013) similarly found that
those who are dependent on remittances were less likely to lobby oﬃcials for economic
assistance and consequently less likely to punish the incumbent party in elections for
poor economic performance. López García (2017, 2018) also found that remittances nega-
tively aﬀect turnout in Mexico using Americas Barometer surveys from 2012–2016 and
municipal-level measures of turnout and remittance receipts. Beyond Mexico, working
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papers by Dionne, Inman, and Montinola (2014) and Ebeke and Yogo (2013) show that
remittances also reduce the propensity to vote in sub-Saharan Africa.
Mexico has also been the site of much of the existing research on the relationship
between crime and electoral turnout. Trelles and Carreras (2012) demonstrated that homi-
cide rates were negatively related to turnout rates in federal elections across Mexican
municipalities. Using individual-level data, they found that Mexican citizens who fear
crime and those who live in violent states were less likely to go to the polls. Ley (2018)
showed that turnout rates (and intentions) are lower in those municipalities where crim-
inal violence targets high-proﬁle political actors. Her results suggest that when organised
crime has the ability to inﬂuence politics (by murdering candidates, party actors or public
authorities, or even ﬁnancing political campaigns), voters’ choices become less meaningful
and cynicism becomes widespread. Consequently, they have fewer incentives to show up
to the polls. Furthermore, violent crime increases the costs of voting by making it more
dangerous to turn out and decreases the beneﬁts by making electoral choices less mean-
ingful. Receiving remittances will increase individuals’ resources and their propensity to
vote, which, as we explain further below, may help to counteract the negative eﬀect of
crime on the decision to turn out to vote.
The electoral consequences of ﬁnancial remittances are usually explained with reference
to the ‘substitution eﬀect.’ As emigrants (via the remittances they send) become the main
providers of public goods and safety nets, their friends and families back home no longer
need to rely on the state for their welfare (or other public goods) and become insulated
from ﬂuctuations in the national economy. As a result, remittance recipients have fewer
economic grievances against the state and fewer incentives to hold governments accoun-
table through elections (Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Germano 2013, 2018). This line of
reasoning is consistent with studies showing that international remittances are a substitute
for state-provided goods and services (Abdih et al. 2012; Ahmed 2012, 2013; Doyle 2015).
In sum, through the ﬁnancial remittances they receive, migrant households become self-
providers of public goods and services, and therefore more autonomous from (or less
dependent on) the state. This substitution in turn lowers the quality of governance in
migrant-sending countries. Governments are then free to divert funds from welfare
goods such as health and education towards regime security and corruption because
remittance recipients can buy welfare goods on the private market and so have less incen-
tive to demand them from the government (Abdih et al. 2012; Ahmed 2013; Ebeke 2012;
Easton and Montinola 2017).
Remittances might also be expected to aﬀect political participation through a more
direct channel: they increase the resources available to recipients that can be used to par-
ticipate politically. Through this resource channel, remittances have been shown to
increase levels of protest and the likelihood of taking part in a variety of political activities
such as strikes, demonstrations and petitions (Dionne, Inman, and Montinola 2014;
Maydom 2017; Escriba-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright 2018; Easton and Montinola
2017). Voting generally requires fewer resources than other forms of political partici-
pation, however, so the consensus is that remittances decrease electoral participation
through the substitution eﬀect while increasing non-electoral participation through the
resource channel (Dionne, Inman, and Montinola 2014; Maydom 2017).
The existing research discussed above focuses on the relationship between remittances
and substitutable public goods such as health and education that can either be provided by
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the state or bought on the private market. Not all public goods are as easy to substitute as
health and education, however; public security is much more diﬃcult to substitute with
market-based alternatives. Recipients may spend remittances in providing security for
themselves through private means (Ley, Ibarra-Olivo, and Meseguer 2019; Doyle and
López García 2019). Or, as Pérez-Arméndariz and Duquette-Rury (2019) show remit-
tance-receiving communities with active home-town associations in Mexico are more
likely to see the formation of vigilante groups. While private security and vigilante
groups can help to improve feelings of security, remittances cannot substitute these for
the full range of issues that weak state monopoly over the use of force entails, including
the lack of rule of law. Hired guards cannot solve crime, legally imprison suspects or dis-
mantle criminal gangs. Where crime and violence are endemic, the well-being of all sectors
in society is likely to be aﬀected.
Even when remittance recipients may be less likely to be victimised or to fear crime (as
Doyle and López García (2019) show), recent work demonstrates that the incidence of
crime and violence in origin countries (or municipalities) can discourage outmigrants
from sending remittances back home (Vargas-Silva 2009; Meseguer, Ley, and Ibarra-
Olivo 2017). Criminal violence therefore increases the need of remittances for coping
with growing security, but at the same time reduces recipients’ access to remittances.
The actual incidence and the perception of crime can thus aﬀect the assets and income
and the well-being of remittance-receiving individuals and households.
In sum, our main argument is that remittance recipients are not immune to the govern-
ment’s inability to deliver security and implement the rule of law even though they may
rely less on the state for welfare, are isolated from volatility in the national economy,
and can provide some measure of private security for themselves.
As noted above, existing research shows that violence has negative eﬀects on political
trust and participation in elections (Ley 2018; Trelles and Carreras 2012). Crime exposure
may, however, increase the incentives of remittance recipients to engage in the political
process in order to inﬂuence government policies on the provision of public security.
Even if recipients had previously been disengaged because they had fewer incentives to
try to inﬂuence the allocation of welfare goods (Germano 2013), or they have better per-
ceptions of public security than non-recipients (Doyle and López García 2019), they are
still aﬀected by pervasive crime. Public security is essential for remittance-receiving house-
holds to continue receiving income from abroad and preserving their income and assets.
Exposure to crime will emphasise the importance of public security to remittance recipi-
ents and increase their incentives to vote to inﬂuence the provision of public security.
Through this mechanism, criminal violence can negate the substitution eﬀect and make
remittance recipients more likely to turn out to vote, even while it makes non-recipients
less likely to turn out. We therefore hypothesise the following:
H1: Remittances have a greater negative eﬀect on turnout in less violent regions and
countries.
H2: Remittance recipients are more likely to turn out to vote if they fear or have experienced
crime.
H3: Non-recipients are less likely to turnout out to vote if they fear or have experienced
crime.
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3. Remittance ﬂows, crime rates and turnout: aggregate-level evidence
from Mexico
3.1. Data and empirical strategy
To analyse the impact of crime on the relationship between electoral turnout and remit-
tances, we begin by analysing aggregate data at the municipal level in Mexico. As discussed
earlier, Mexico is the site of much research on the consequences of remittances and crime
on turnout, likely due to its high levels of both emigration and criminal violence. It has the
world’s second-largest emigrant population and is the second-largest remittance-receiving
country. While Mexico’s homicide rate is low by Latin American standards, levels of vio-
lence have increased in recent years, especially since 2006 when President Felipe Calderon
declared war against drug cartels.1 As levels of violence have grown, the incidence of other
forms of crime (such as robbery, extortion and theft) have increased (Durán-Martínez
2018). On a sub-national level, Mexican states and municipalities vary signiﬁcantly in
terms of (i) electoral participation rates, (ii) the proportion of households receiving remit-
tances, (iii) and levels of criminal violence. The country is therefore a good case for ana-
lysing cross-sectionally whether the impact of remittances on turnout varies according to
actual levels of criminal violence.
To test our ﬁrst hypothesis that remittances have a greater negative eﬀect on turnout in
less violent regions, we use municipal-level data collected from a variety of publicly avail-
able sources. Information on electoral participation rates was collected from the National
Electoral Institute of Mexico (INE). Data on international remittances comes from the
Mexican National Population Council (CONAPO) and is based on the 2010 Mexican
Census conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Infor-
mation on intentional homicides, deﬁned as ‘unlawful deaths purposefully inﬂicted on a
person by another person’ (UNODC 2013), was also collected from INEGI, and other
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of municipalities were obtained from
INEGI and the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy
(CONEVAL).
We use homicide rates as a proxy of the incidence of crime, since data on other types of
crimes (such as robbery, theft, assault or burglary) may vary according to citizens’ varying
propensity to report crimes to state authorities and diﬀerences in the classiﬁcation and col-
lection of crime statistics by state agencies. Since homicide rates are registered by health
institutions, they are considered the most reliable cross-regional and -national measure
of crime (Fearon 2011).
The dependent variable is municipal-level turnout in the 2012 presidential election, and
the main independent variables are the proportion of households receiving remittances
and the homicide rate in a given municipality.
Voter turnout in presidential elections measures the total number of votes cast in the
2012 presidential election divided by the total number of registered voters. It is a continu-
ous variable that ranges from 0 to 100. Only votes cast by nationals who resided in the
country at the time of the presidential election are considered. The average voter
turnout for the 2012 presidential election was 64.7% (range: 0%–94.5%).
Remittance-receiving households measures the share of households in a municipality
which reported having received remittances from abroad during the period 2005–2010.
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Between 2005 and 2010 the average share of households (for all municipalities) receiving
remittances was 6.52% (range: 0%–48.7%).
Rate of homicide measures the number of homicides per 100,000 habitants that
occurred in the six months prior to the 2012 presidential election. The average homicide
rate per 100,000 inhabitants in a given municipality was 10.31 (range: 0–291). It is impor-
tant to note that the distribution of homicides rates varies greatly across municipalities and
is highly skewed to the right. During the period under study, 50% of the municipalities
exhibit violence levels under 2.35 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, whereas 25% of the
municipalities included in the sample had homicides rates above 11.13.2
In the ﬁgures below, we plot municipality-level turnout in the 2012 presidential election
against the proportion of households receiving remittances (Figure 1) and the rate of
homicide (Figure 2). We can see that there is a negative relationship between the pro-
portion of households receiving remittances and turnout rates. However, many of the
data points do not fall along the trend line (Figure 1), indicating a high level of variance
that is unaccounted for. Figure 2 shows that turnout rates are negatively associated with
homicide rates although the regression slope is less steep and there is even greater
variance.
The proportion of remittance-receiving households and homicide rates are our inde-
pendent variables of interest, but we also control for a battery of political and socio-demo-
graphic variables that can aﬀect voter turnout rates. We include a full description and
summary statistics of the variables used in the municipal-level models in the Supplemen-
tary Material. All models also include state dummies to capture otherwise unobserved het-
erogeneity across Mexican federal states. To correct for heteroskedasticity, robust standard
errors are used in all of the models.
Figure 1. Remittances and turnout in Mexican Municipalities.
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Our analysis uses an instrumental variable modelling approach. The reasons are
twofold. Since the proportion of households receiving remittances in a given municipality
is not randomly assigned, there is a risk that model estimates could be biased. It is also
likely that a higher level of violence in a municipality could lead to higher emigration,
which itself could lead to higher remittances. To correct for this, the proportion of house-
holds that received remittances in a given municipality in 2000 is used as an instrumental
variable to enable the prediction of the random assignment of this variable.
3.2. Results
Table 1 reports the results obtained using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation, in
which the instrument for current remittance ﬂows is the proportion of households that
received international remittances in 2000.3 The results show that the share of households
receiving international remittances is negatively associated with turnout in the 2012 pre-
sidential election in a given municipality. The relationship is substantively important:
increasing remittances by one standard deviation leads to a 3.7% decrease in turnout.
This ﬁnding corroborates earlier ﬁndings that international remittances have a negative
eﬀect on electoral turnout in Mexico (Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Germano 2013;
López Garcia 2018). We can also see from Table 1 that the homicide rate is negatively
related to voter turnout rates in a municipality; again, this corroborates the ﬁndings of pre-
vious studies on the negative relationship between turnout and the level of violence in
Mexico (Trelles and Carreras 2012; Vivanco et al. 2014; Ley 2018).
To examine whether the relationship between remittances and voter turnout varies
with the level of criminal violence in a municipality, Models 2 and 4 interact the
Figure 2. Crime and Turnout in Mexican Municipalities.
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proportion of remittance-recipient households with the homicide rate in a given munici-
pality. The interaction term is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, which indicates that the
turnout-suppressing eﬀect of remittances weakens as the homicide rate increases. It is
important to note the substantive importance of this channel. Increasing a municipality’s
homicide rate by one standard deviation will reduce the negative impact of remittances on
participation by 13%. These results hold after controlling for the party in government, the
electoral strength of parties, and the shared partisanship of municipal mayors with state
governors, as well as other socio-economic and demographic factors.
Given the signiﬁcant dispersion of homicide rates across municipalities, we also
conduct the above analysis separately for diﬀerent groups of municipalities. To that
end, we group municipalities into bins based on their homicide rates. As a baseline
group, we use municipalities below the 50th percentile of homicides. The remaining
Table 1. Linear regression models – Mexico.
Dependent variable: Turnout rates in the 2012 presidential election
2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remittance-receiving households −0.513***
(0.038)
−0.534***
(0.039)
−0.534***
(0.043)
−0.560***
(0.044)
−0.515***
(0.038)
−0.550***
(0.044)
Homicide rate −0.017*
(0.008)
−0.040**
(0.015)
−0.024**
(0.007)
−0.047***
(0.012)
Remittances*homicides 0.003*
(0.001)
0.003*
(0.001)
Homicide rate – 50th percentile −0.126
(0.433)
−0.294
(0.632)
Homicide rate – 60th percentile 0.231
(0.468)
−0.107
(0.689)
Homicide rate – 70th percentile −0.141
(0.508)
−0.460
(0.812)
Homicide rate – 80th percentile 1.042*
(0.519)
0.349
(0.843)
Homicide rate – 90th percentile −1.691**
(0.572)
−3.628***
(0.958)
Remittances* Homicides – 50th 0.012
(0.098)
Remittances*Homicides – 60th 0.044
(0.068)
Remittances*Homicides – 70th 0.039
(0.080)
Remittances*Homicides – 80th 0.086
(0.077)
Remittances*Homicides – 90th 0.245**
(0.080)
Shared partisanship 0.531
(0.322)
0.543
(0.321)
PAN mayor 0.188
(0.388)
0.146
(0.388)
PRI mayor −0.385
(0.409)
−0.380
(0.408)
State eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,430 2,430 2,013 2,013 2,430 2,430
R2 0.607 0.607 0.686 0.687 0.609 0.610
Adjusted R2 0.600 0.600 0.678 0.679 0.601 0.602
Residual Std. Error 6.685 (df =
2385)
6.682 (df =
2384)
5.455 (df =
1965)
5.443 (df =
1964)
6.673 (df =
2381)
6.669 (df =
2376)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coeﬃcients signiﬁcant at *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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municipalities are then grouped into four bins. The results are reported in Models 5 and 6
in Table 1. One important ﬁnding of this exercise is that the eﬀect of homicides on the link
between remittances and turnout is fully driven by the municipalities in the highest homi-
cide group. This is intuitive because we would expect the eﬀect to be most prominent in
the most violent municipalities. Furthermore, comparing the eﬀect across diﬀerent bins
highlights that the documented impact of homicides is highly nonlinear, small in magni-
tude for most municipalities but highly important for the top of the homicide distribution.
In particular, our results show that the eﬀect of remittances on participation in the highest
homicide bin is 45% smaller than in baseline municipalities. Thus, for these municipalities,
the eﬀect of violence on the link between remittances and electoral participation is more
than three times larger than the eﬀect we estimated in our pooled baseline speciﬁcation.4
Figure 3 shows the estimated eﬀect of remittances on turnout rates in high, medium, low
violent municipalities, based on their standard deviation from the mean.
Overall, results using data from the Mexican 2012 presidential election conﬁrm that
remittances have a negative inﬂuence on turnout rates in emigrants’ home municipalities.
However, this impact is reduced by the level of violence that a municipality experiences.
Figure 3. The eﬀects of remittances on turnout conditioned by crime in Mexican municipalities.
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This result is predominantly driven by those Mexican municipalities that experience the
highest rates of violence.
4. Remittance receipt, crime victimisation and voting: individual-level
evidence from Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa
4.1. Data and empirical strategy
To examine the micro-level drivers behind the aggregate-level relationship between remit-
tances, crime and electoral turnout, we turn to survey data. One caveat when using survey
data is that we do not know whether individuals began receiving remittances, or were
exposed to criminal violence, before or after the elections. We thus restrict our analyses
to surveys that were conducted within twelve months of an election. This means that
we cannot use survey data from Mexico; no LAPOP-Americas Barometer survey has
been ever conducted in Mexico in the twelve months prior to a national election and
other surveys do not include all the requisite questions for our analysis.5
To test whether individual perceptions of insecurity and crime victimisation inﬂuence
the incentives of remittance-recipients to participate in elections, we use data from Latin
America and the Caribbean (LAC) and Africa. Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa
contain important migrant-sending countries where violence is regularly used as a
mean to electorally compete for power, including Mexico, Colombia, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, Kenya, Jamaica, and South Africa (see Pérez Armendáriz 2019).
Although they are the world regions with the highest levels of homicide (UNODC
2013), at the national level, there are important variations in terms of crime rates and
the level of remittances received. These regions are therefore good cases for analysing
whether the impact of remittances on turnout varies according to crime exposure.
LAC has an average annual homicide rate of more than 20 per 100,000 people, which is
more than three times the world average. In the past 25 years, robberies in the region have
tripled and more than 1 million people died as a result of criminal violence (The Econom-
ist, January 10, 2014). El Salvador and Honduras have high homicide rates that are similar
to those during civil wars (over 70 in 2010). Violence is also widespread in Venezuela,
Jamaica and Guatemala (with rates over 40 in 2014). Countries with below-average homi-
cide rates include Chile (3.7 in 2010), Peru (5.4 in 2012) and Argentina (5.5 in 2012).
Figure 4 shows homicide rates in Latin America by country.
While Africa has the second-highest homicide rate of world regions, most African
countries have signiﬁcantly lower levels of violence than countries in Latin America
(UNODC 2013). The highest rates of homicide on the continent are found in South
Africa (34.27 in 2015) and Lesotho (38.00 in 2010), but even these countries have much
lower levels of criminal violence than those at the top of the distribution in Latin
America. The countries with the lowest homicide rates on the continent, including
Burkina Faso (0.71 in 2012) and Madagascar (0.62 in 2010), also have substantially
lower levels of violence than low-crime states in Latin America.
Data from LAC was gathered from the 2010–2014 waves of LAPOP-Americas Barom-
eter, and data from Africa was obtained from the 4th wave of the Afrobarometer con-
ducted in 2008–2009. We employ these surveys because they include data on
respondents’ past participation in elections, status as remittance recipients and
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experiences and fears of crime and violence. As explained above, we limit the analysis to
those countries in which elections were held in the twelve months prior to the survey,
which excludes Mexico from the analysis. However, using data from countries other
than Mexico can allow us to verify whether the joint eﬀect of crime and remittances are
speciﬁc to Mexico or apply more broadly. This is important considering that most
studies on the political eﬀects of international remittances are based on the case of Mexico.
Our main dependent variable is voting in national elections, coded 1 if respondents said
they ‘voted in the last national elections’ and 0 if they did not vote. Figures 5 and 6 plot the
proportion of respondents who claimed to have voted in the most recent national elections
in the countries from which data was analysed. In Africa, reported turnouts range from
61% in Nigeria to 92% in Benin. Similarly, in Latin America, reported turnout ranges
from 63% in Jamaica to 94% in Chile and Uruguay.6
The main independent variables for our study are individuals’ status as remittance-reci-
pients and their perceptions of and exposure to crime. Remittance-recipient status is regis-
tered as 1 if respondents answered aﬃrmatively to the question ‘Do you, or someone in
your household, receive money from abroad?’; and 0, otherwise.
Figure 4. Homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean.
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Figure 5. Reported turnout in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Figure 6. Reported turnout in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Crime victimisation is coded from questions indicating whether the respondent herself
or any of the members living in her household have been victims of any type of crime in
the past 12 months. In LAPOP, the crime question includes ‘robbery, burglary, assault,
fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime.’ In Afrobarometer,
the questions ask whether the respondent or their family had been ‘physically attacked’ or
‘had something stolen’ over the past year. Because the questions on crime victimisation in
both LAPOP and Afrobarometer ask about events that occurred over the previous twelve
months, we only include data from countries which held a national election in the year
preceding the survey. Including earlier elections would mean that we would be modelling
the eﬀect of the experience of crime after an election on participation in that election.
While the exclusion of data from countries in which the election was more than twelve
months before the survey will help to limit this problem, we cannot be certain that
crime experiences reported will necessarily have occurred before the election. Similarly,
we do not know whether respondents ﬁrst began to receive remittances before or after
the election. Our results will therefore be biased towards ﬁnding no relationship
between crime victimisation, remittances and electoral participation.
Perceived feelings of insecurity are coded from questions asking whether respondents
believe that their neighbourhood is unsafe (LAPOP) or whether they have feared crime in
their own home over the previous twelve months (Afrobarometer).
In addition to our key dependent variables of interest, our statistical models also control
for a battery of socio-demographic characteristics as well as political opinions and beha-
viours that are likely to aﬀect the propensity to vote. Socio-demographic controls include
gender, age (and a square of age to capture non-linear eﬀects), rural/urban residence, edu-
cation, employment status, wealth and religiosity. Political controls include support for
democracy, satisfaction with democracy, level of interest in politics, political eﬃcacy, pol-
itical awareness and attendance at community meetings. To control for citizens’ evalu-
ations of the national government’s state capacity to ensure citizen security, we also
include variables based on questions about respondents’ conﬁdence in the judicial
system and the police. A full description of all the variables used in the models is available
in the Supplementary Material.
The models estimated using data from LAPOP also account for a set of contextual vari-
ables which may aﬀect aggregate turnout at the country level: homicide rates, compulsory
voting with sanctions and gross domestic product per capita and remittance inﬂows as
percentage of the country’s GDP. Data for the country-level variables are taken from
the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators and Global Finance Indicators. Unfortu-
nately, there are too few countries in the Afrobarometer analysis to estimate multi-level
models with country-level variables.
Figures 7 and 8 show the proportions of remittance recipients and crime victims in each
country included in the analyses. In both the LAPOP and Afrobarometer samples, 34% of
respondents reported that they or members of their household had been victims of a crime
in the previous 12 months. 64% of LAPOP respondents thought their neighbourhood to be
unsafe, while 35% of Afrobarometer respondents feared crime in their own homes. There
were a signiﬁcant number of remittance recipients in both surveys: 11% in the LAPOP
sample and 21% in the Afrobarometer sample.
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As our dependent variable of interest is a dichotomous variable – whether a respondent
voted or not – we use a logit estimator. To mitigate the problem of ‘selection on observa-
bles’ which can bias estimates in analyses of survey data, we employ the Coarsened Exact
Matching (CEM) method (Iacus, King, and Porro 2012). CEM is a nonparametric match-
ing method that helps to reduce the imbalance between untreated and treated groups. In
this study, the treatment group is made up of respondents who receive remittances.7
Respondents were matched on the pre-treatment variables of age, gender, size of place
of residence, and either years of education (in Latin America) or level of education (in
Africa). By adjusting for the distribution of covariates between remittance recipients
and non-recipients, matching can allow us to separate the eﬀect of remittances from
other factors shaping individuals’ electoral turnout, and thus to create more valid compari-
sons. Using this method comes at a cost: observations that are not matched are discarded.
The resulting sample is thus smaller, but the data is more balanced in the control variables
between the treated and control observations. We also estimate all the statistical models
using unmatched data to ensure that our results are not driven by the choice of matching
method.
Figure 7. Remittance receipt and crime in Latin America and the Caribbean.
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In the models using data from LAPOP, we use mixed-eﬀects multilevel modelling with
individual respondents nested in countries. Multilevel models allow us to control for
important contextual factors that may bias the results and therefore allow for a more
precise estimation of individual-level factors. We estimate random coeﬃcient models,
in which coeﬃcients and intercepts vary across countries. By so doing, we condition
the impact of remittances on electoral participation by country.
As there are only nine countries in our Africa sample, specifying full multi-level models
with predictors at both individual and country levels would be impractical; the small
number of countries would likely lead to biased results. It is nevertheless important to
control for country-speciﬁc factors that might inﬂuence voting. We therefore employ
two separate strategies to account for country-level variation: hierarchical random
eﬀects and country-ﬁxed eﬀects.
While we cannot be fully assured that these empirical strategies will prevent challenges
to inference from selection eﬀects and country-level variation, if similar results are found
in multiple models in diﬀerent regions then we can have greater conﬁdence than if we only
use one empirical strategy.
4.2. Results: Latin America
Table 2 presents a series of binary logistic regression models with country ﬁxed eﬀects esti-
mating reported turnout at the individual level of analysis in Latin America. Models 1–4
show the coeﬃcients obtained before matching, and Models 5-8 show the coeﬃcients
obtained after matching. In Latin America, the probability of voting does not vary
between remittance recipients and non-recipients. Crime victimisation and perceptions
Figure 8. Remittance receipt and Crime in sub-Saharan Africa.
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of insecurity in the respondent’s neighbourhood are not signiﬁcant predictors of the prob-
ability of voting either. To examine whether the probability that a remittance recipient
votes changes with her exposure and perceptions of crime and violence, the models
include a series of interaction terms. However, none of the interaction terms achieves stat-
istical signiﬁcance. That is, the eﬀects of crime victimisation and fear of crime on the prob-
ability of voting do not vary across remittance recipients and non-recipients.
Since levels of crime victimisation or insecurity perceptions might not necessarily match
actual levels of insecurity in the region (Dammert and Salazar Tobar 2017) we are also inter-
ested in examining whether variation in the homicide rate at the country level can explain
variations in the propensity of remittance recipients to go to the polls. Table 3 presents the
coeﬃcients obtained using random coeﬃcient models. As we can see, the probability of
Table 2. Binary logistic regression models – Latin America.
Dependent variable: Reported turnout
Unmatched Matched
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Remittance-recipient 0.981
(0.065)
0.967
(0.080)
0.981
(0.065)
1.137
(0.112)
0.979
(0.065)
0.960
(0.080)
0.979
(0.065)
1.159
(0.112)
Victimisation 0.999
(0.047)
0.993
(0.050)
0.999
(0.047)
0.992
(0.050)
Remittances*
Victimisation
1.041
(0.129)
1.055
(0.130)
Unsafe neighbourhood 1.027
(0.045)
1.055
(0.048)
1.055
(0.046)
1.089
(0.049)
Remittances* Unsafe neighbourhood 0.804
(0.133)
0.777
(0.134)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 20,476 20,476 20,476 20,476 18,808 18,808 18,808 18,808
Countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Country eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Exponentiated coeﬃcients. Standard errors in parentheses. Coeﬃcients signiﬁcant at *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p <
0.001.
Table 3. Random coeﬃcient models – Latin America.
Dependent variable: Reported Turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Remittance recipient 0.971
(0.069)
0.955
(0.085)
0.971
(0.069)
1.122
(0.113)
0.866
(0.093)
Victimisation 0.998
(0.047)
0.992
(0.050)
Remittance*victimisation 1.044
(0.130)
Unsafe neighbourhood 1.027
(0.045)
1.055
(0.048)
Remittance*unsafety perception 0.801
(0.133)
Homicide rate (log) 2.343
(0.502)
2.335
(0.501)
2.353
(0.502)
2.303
(0.503)
2.566
(0.489)
Remittance*homicide rate 1.760*
(0.240)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 20,476 20,476 20,476 20,476 20,476
Number of countries 16 16 16 16 16
Notes: Exponentiated Coeﬃcients. Standard errors in parentheses. Coeﬃcients signiﬁcant at *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p <
0.001.
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voting does not vary with the homicide rate at the country level. However, the cross-level
interaction term between remittance-recipient status and homicide rates at the country
level is positive and signiﬁcant. This indicates that remittance-receiving individuals who
live in countries with higher than average levels of violence have a higher probability of
turnout than remittance-receiving individuals living in countries with lower than average
levels of violence. Figure 9 shows that with increasing homicide rates (along the x axis),
the magnitude of the coeﬃcient of remittance-recipient status on the probability of voting
also increases (along the y axis). Overall, therefore, the evidence from Latin America is con-
sistentwith the above results at the subnational level onMexico.The impact of remittances on
turnout varies according to the actual levels of violence inmigrants’ home country (ormuni-
cipality). This supports one of our key hypotheses and suggests that remittances have a posi-
tive eﬀect on turnout in the violent democracies of Latin America.
4.3. Results: sub-Saharan Africa
In Table 4, we display the results of the models estimating voter turnout as a function of
remittance receipts and experiences with crime as well as a full battery of control variables
Figure 9. The eﬀects of remittances on voting conditioned by national crime rates in Latin America.
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 17
using the Afrobarometer data.8 Our key hypotheses are tested in columns 3, 4, 7 and 8, in
which we model how the interaction between receiving remittances and crime experiences
aﬀects the likelihood of voting. While voting and being a victim or fearful of crime are sep-
arately associated with lower voting rates, the interaction term in both models is positive.
This result implies that experiencing or fearing crime mitigates the negative eﬀect of remit-
tances on the propensity to vote. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis of no relation-
ship between crime, remittances and voting.
While the Table 4 shows us the statistical signiﬁcance, what is more important is the sub-
stantive impact of individual experiences with crime on the relationship between remit-
tances and voting. Figures 10 and 11 plot the predicted probabilities of voting for
hypothetical individuals based on the models presented in columns 4 and 8. Each bar
Table 4. Eﬀect of remittances and crime on voting in sub-Saharan Africa.
DV = Voted at Last
National Election (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Remittance 0.898
(−0.062)
0.888
(0.060)*
0.794
(0.069)***
0.792
(0.068)***
0.886
(0.061)*
0.877
(0.059)*
0.759
(0.064)***
0.764
(0.064)***
Crime Victim 0.872
(0.053)**
0.881
(0.052)**
0.803
(0.057)***
0.821
(0.055)***
Remittance * Crime
Victim
1.369
(0.186)**
1.336
(0.180)**
Feared Crime 0.907
(−0.055)
0.936
(−0.056)
0.814
(0.057)***
0.855
(0.058)**
Remittance * Feared
Crime
1.534
(0.212)***
1.463
(0.201)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matched? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Respondents/countries 7,743/9 7,691/9 7,743/9 7,691/9 7,746/9 7.694/9 7,746/9 7,694/9
Notes: Logit models with random eﬀects (unmatched data) or ﬁxed eﬀects (matched data). Odds ratios reported with stan-
dard errors in brackets. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Description of controls and full regression tables available in the
supplementary material.
Figure 10. The eﬀects of remittances and experiences of crime on turnout in sub-Saharan Africa.
18 A. I. LÓPEZ GARCÍA AND B. MAYDOM
represents a 30-year-old woman with a secondary education, who lives in a rural area
without internal plumbing, owns a radio but not a television or a car, is not formally
employed, does not feel close to a particular political party, and has the mean average
opinions on other questions included in the analysis. While each of the women are the
same with respect to these qualities, they vary in their receipt of remittances, their experi-
ences with crime, and the likelihood that theywill have turned out to vote in the last national
election.
Starting with the ﬁrst two bars on the left of Figure 10, which represent the predicted
probability of voting for those who do not receive remittances, we can see that being a
victim of crime makes individuals signiﬁcantly less likely to vote. The ﬁrst bar shows
that our non-remittance receiving woman with no crime experiences is the most likely
of the four hypothetical women to have voted, with a predicted probability of 0.65. In con-
trast, the non-remittance receiving woman who suﬀered an assault or burglary (rep-
resented by the second bar) was less likely to have voted, with a predicted probability
of voting of 0.61.
Turning to the two women who do receive remittances, we can see that the eﬀect of
experiencing crime on voting is altogether diﬀerent. For remittance recipients, experiences
of crime increased, rather than decreased, the propensity to vote. Our hypothetical remit-
tance recipient who was not a victim of crime had a predicted probability of voting of 0.61,
but her twin who was victimised had a slightly higher probability of 0.63. This is a small
diﬀerence, but what is interesting is that experiencing crime had the opposite eﬀect on the
two remittance recipients compared with the two non-recipients.
By comparing these hypothetical women, we can also see that receiving remittances has
a similar impact on the propensity to vote as being a victim of crime: both reduced the
likelihood of voting by four percentage points. In addition, Figure 10 suggests that experi-
encing crime does not completely nullify the turnout-suppressing eﬀects of remittances;
the victimised remittance recipient was two percentage points less likely to vote that the
individual who did not receive remittances and was not victimised.
Figure 11. The eﬀects of remittances and fears of crime on turnout in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Fear of crime has an even stronger eﬀect on remittance recipients than non-recipients.
While fear of crime has less of a negative eﬀect on the propensity to vote on its own, the
predicted probabilities plotted in Figure 11 indicate that remittance recipients who fear
crime are substantially more likely to vote than those who do not. An individual with
the same baseline characteristics as the remittance-receiving women mentioned above
would be 4 percentage points more likely to vote if she reported fearing crime in her
own home. If she did not receive remittances, fearing crime would decrease her likelihood
of voting by 6 percentage points.
In Mexico and Latin America, the relationship between remittances and turnout is
modulated by the general context of violence, but in Africa individual perceptions and
experience of violence mitigate the impact of remittances on turnout. While the limited
number of countries with data available precludes a full multilevel analysis, Figure 12
(homicide rate – remittance recipient voting) suggests that the turnout rate of remittance
recipients is not related to the level of violence in African countries. When splitting the
Afrobarometer sample into high- and low-crime countries, however, the coeﬃcient of
the interaction between individual experiences of crime and remittance-recipient status
is signiﬁcant in the low-crime countries but not in the high-crime countries (see Table
S10). In Latin America, however, the interaction variable remains insigniﬁcant even
after splitting the sample into quartiles according to the distribution of the homicide
rate (see Table S11). We should bear in mind that, as discussed above, crime rates in
Africa are signiﬁcantly lower than in Latin America. While in Africa the safest countries
(Burkina Faso and Madagascar) have under 1 homicide per 100,000 people, in Latin
America the least violent democracies (Chile, Peru and Argentina) have between 3–6
homicides per 100,000 people. These observations suggest that individual experiences
and fears of crime are more important in negating the remittance substitution eﬀect in
low-crime countries (regions), while the wider context of crime is more important in
Figure 12. Homicide rates and remittance recipient voting in sub-Saharan Africa.
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medium- and high-crime countries (regions). Future research could fruitfully explore
these diﬀerences between Africa and Latin America in more detail and investigate the
relationship between remittances, crime and voting in other regions of the world.
Overall, the results from the models using Afrobarometer data are consistent with those
found at the aggregate level in Mexico and the individual level in Latin America described
above: crime exposure makes remittance recipients more likely to vote but non-recipients
less likely to vote. The results from Africa also conﬁrm and extend the ﬁndings of existing
studies of the relationships between remittances and voting and crime and voting test, which
mostly test theories using data from Latin America. Indeed, our study is the ﬁrst to inves-
tigate whether crime lowers electoral turnout outside Latin America; on this evidence we
can tentatively accept that these ﬁndings can be generalised to sub-Saharan Africa.
5. Conclusion
There is consistent evidence that crime and violence may make citizens dissatisﬁed and
less trusting of political institutions (Carreras 2013; Ceobanu, Wood, & Ribeiro 2010;
Cruz 2003), and therefore less likely to vote (Trelles and Carreras 2012; Vivanco et al.
2014; Ley 2018). Similarly, previous studies have suggested that remittances can cause reci-
pients to disengage from electoral politics by insulating them from economic conditions in
their home country (Germano 2013, 2018; Ebeke and Yogo 2013; Dionne, Inman, and
Montinola 2014). In this paper, however, we have shown that the turnout-suppressing
eﬀects of violence and remittances do not reinforce one another. To the contrary, our evi-
dence suggests that crime and violence can bring remittance recipients out from their elec-
toral isolation by reducing their sense of insulation from domestic politics.
These ﬁndings help to reﬁne our understanding of the electoral consequences of inter-
national migration. Financial remittances are often conceptualised as a substitute for
welfare and state-provided assistance, and this ‘substitution eﬀect’ can foster disengage-
ment in formal political processes amongst recipients. But while remittance recipients
can aﬀord to buy some level of private security for themselves, they cannot fully substitute
for a lack of public security provided by a government. The failure of the state to contain
crime and violence can discourage outmigrants from sending remittances back home
(Vargas-Silva 2009; Meseguer, Ley, and Ibarra-Olivo 2017). Public security is essential
for remittance-receiving households to preserving their income and assets. Although
remittance recipients might have more resources to protect themselves against insecurity
and feel safer than non-recipients, exposure to crime can shatter that illusion of security
(or isolation from national events) and make them more likely to vote to demand security
and protection from the state. However, it would be a mistake to think that remittances
will necessarily strengthen electoral accountability in violent democracies. As shown by
Doyle and López García (2019), members of remittance-receiving households in
Mexico are less likely to punish incumbents for the occurrence of violence. Where violence
is a feature of democratic politics, as it is in many parts of Latin America and sub-Saharan
Africa, the ways in which migrant remittances interact with the meaning and incentives to
participate in elections deserves further investigation (Pérez-Arméndariz 2019).
This paper is the ﬁrst to examine the joint eﬀects of remittances and crime on turnout
and the ﬁrst to study the eﬀect of crime on voting beyond the case of Mexico. Our analysis
is based on multiple sources of data from diﬀerent countries and regions and used
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evidence at the aggregate and individual levels of analysis. We analysed within-country
variations in turnout, violence and remittances for more than 2000 Mexican municipali-
ties and survey data on remittances, crime victimisation and voting from Africa and Latin
America. The aggregate data from Mexico showed us that, as the rate of homicides in a
given municipality increases, the impact of remittances on voter turnout rates in emi-
grants’ home municipalities weakens. This ﬁnding is mainly driven by municipalities
that experience very high rates of criminal violence. Survey data from other Latin Amer-
ican countries showed that the probability of voting among remittance recipients increases
as the level of criminal violence in the country level rises. Data from Mexico and Latin
America thus show that the context of violence negates the inﬂuence of remittances on
turnout.
Results from Latin America suggest that the likelihood of remittance recipients to vote
is not aﬀected by individual experiences and perceptions of crime. However, survey data
from Sub-Saharan Africa showed that remittance recipients who have been or fear becom-
ing victims of a crime are more likely to vote. Our results were not completely clear-cut: in
Latin America, the probability of voting for remittance recipients was not found to be
aﬀected by individuals’ exposure to, or perceptions of, crime to a statistically signiﬁcant
degree. Nevertheless, we presented initial evidence that country-level crime rates were
more important in aﬀecting remittance recipients’ political participation in medium-
and high-crime contexts, while individual-level experiences and fear of crime are more
important in low-crime contexts. Future work should explore these regional variations
in greater depth.
Overall, the results of this study contribute to our understanding of how violent plur-
alism conditions the relationship between transnational migration and political develop-
ment by illustrating how migrant remittances interact with violence in shaping citizens’
incentives to participate in elections (Pérez Armendáriz 2019). They also shed new light
on the substitution eﬀect of remittances for state-provided goods. While it is true that
many state-provided goods can be purchased on the private market using increased
resources from remittances and thus may cause recipients to disengage from formal pol-
itical institutions, certain public goods can only be fully provided by the state. Experiences
and fears of crime in Africa and living in high-crime regions in Mexico and Latin America
make remittance recipients more likely to engage with formal political processes because
they are aﬀected by the lack of state-provided public security. While crime usually
decreases formal political participation by inducing fear in individuals and making the
political process appear less meaningful, the opposite eﬀect is found amongst remittance
recipients. To fully comprehend the political causes and consequences of international
remittances, we must attend to the ways in which crime aﬀects political preferences and
actions in migrants’ origin countries (Bateson 2012; Ley 2018; Trelles and Carreras
2012; Phillips 2017).
Our paper has a number of limitations, and its results should be corroborated using
data from other countries and regions and alternative research designs. Given data limit-
ations, our analysis only considered participation in national elections. In various
countries, however, local governments take on a signiﬁcant level of responsibility for
ﬁghting crime. Hence, subnational data from other countries can help us to better under-
stand the relationships of interest, especially in contexts where ‘violent pluralism’ persists
at the local level. Further research could also use panel data to supplement the cross-
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sectional analyses presented here, as well as survey data fromMexico to evaluate the ques-
tion at the individual level in addition to the aggregate level. As new data becomes avail-
able, researchers could investigate the impact of the frequency and amount of remittances
sent on voter turnout and how this relationship is aﬀected by the context of violence as
well as individual experiences and perceptions of crime.
Our paper contributes to the emergent literature examining how violent pluralism
conditions the eﬀects of remittances and crime on other aspects of political behav-
iour, including incumbent support, vigilante activities and non-electoral forms of
political participation (see Pérez-Arméndariz and Duquette-Rury 2019; Doyle and
López García 2019; Ley, Ibarra-Olivo, and Meseguer 2019). Furthermore, the
inﬂuence of remittances on government spending on military and public security
would be a worthwhile topic for investigation. Existing studies have found that
remittances reduce redistributive social spending, increase health and education
spending in democratic and well-governed states and increase military spending in
autocracies (Ebeke 2012; Doyle 2015; Easton and Montinola 2017). The results of
these undertakings will provide a clearer understanding of the impact of inter-
national remittances on political behaviour and public policies in origin democracies
where violence and crime underpin political competition and outcomes (Pérez-
Arméndariz 2019).
Notes
1. As of 2017, Mexico had an estimated homicide rate of 22.5 per 100,000 people. Although
murder rates are at record highs in Mexico, they are still low in comparison to other countries
of the region, such as Venezuela (89 per 100,000), El Salvador (60), and Jamaica (55.7) and
Honduras (42.4).
2. These rates include all intentional homicides, not just drug-related homicides.
3. Results from an Ordinary Least Squares estimation are also reported in Table S9 in the Sup-
plementary Material. Comparing this with Table 1, we can see that the remittances coeﬃcient
increases in absolute value after instrumenting. This is consistent with attenuation bias
induced by the endogeneity of remittances and highlights the need to use an instrumental
variable strategy. We therefore only report estimates obtained using 2SLS.
4. In all the speciﬁcations based on data aggregated at the municipal level, the instrumental vari-
ables pass the ‘weak instruments’ and ‘Wu-Hausman’ tests, which assess the strength of the
instruments and the consistency of the 2SLS estimation as compared to OLS. The weak
instruments test proves that the instrument has a strong correlation with the endogenous
explanatory variable, whereas theWu-Hausman test identiﬁes whether the instrumental vari-
able estimation is as consistent as the OLS method.
5. The latest two presidential elections in Mexico were held on 1 July 2012 and 2 July 2006.
However, ﬁeldwork for the 2012 and 2006 waves of the Americas Barometer took place
between 25 January - 19 February 2012, and 6 -29 June 2006, respectively. An alternative
survey is the Mexican Post-Election Study; however, this survey does not provide infor-
mation on whether participants receive remittances. ‘Las Américas y el Mundo’ is another
excellent survey project that gathers information on individual attitudes, interests, and prac-
tices on issues related to foreign policy and international relations, including international
migration. It includes data on individual remittance-recipient status, socioeconomic charac-
teristics as well as political practices, including turnout. Although the 2012 wave of this
survey was held two months after Mexico’s presidential election of 2012, it does not
include questions on individual exposure to and perceptions of crime. Questions on
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individual crime victimisation were added in subsequent waves of the ‘Las Américas y el
Mundo’ survey.
6. Data on intentions to vote are also available in both survey projects, but vote intentions are
prone to signiﬁcant over-reporting. In the African survey sample, for instance, 87.6% of
respondents claimed they would vote in the next election, while 71.8% of respondents
claimed to have voted in the last election.
7. CEM has been used in a number of recent studies using survey data to analyse the political
eﬀects of remittances (Ahmed 2017; Aparicio, Meseguer, and Jaupart 2017).
8. We only show the coeﬃcients of our independent variables of interest. The full regression
table is available in the Supplementary Material.
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